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Architectural copyright:
recent developments
This article traces the development of American copyright law as it
applies to architectural works from its earliest foundations in the
United States Constitution until the enactment of the Architectural
Works Copyright Protection Act in 1990. By focusing on the
outcomes of the latest legislation through recent case law affecting
residential design, the authors evaluate the effectiveness of the
protection and illustrate some unintended consequences. In
addition, they discuss architectural originality and its relationship to
legal protection in the context of individual design freedom.

The concept of originality in architectUral design
creates some interesting issues for the profession.
While architects regularly struggle with creating new,
innovative design solutions, they often need to use
traditional andfor conventional architectural
configurations. Clients' requirements and
expectations often influence the degree of originality
in a project, which may be further influenced by
budgetary constraints, site limitations, available
construction materials, zoning ordinances, building
codes and design review boards. The issue of originality
provides even more challenges when considered from
a legal perspective, particularly in light of the relatively
recent enactment in the United States of the
Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act 1990 (the
AWCP Act) (United States Congress, 1990a). This
legislation was enacted to bring U.S. copyright law into
adherence with the Berne Convention, an
international treaty dealing with intellectual property,
and was drafted to provide greater protection for
architects in retaining ownership of their intellectual
property. We believe that the Act is far from perfect and
may have resulted in several unexpected outcomes
that do not favour the architect.
This article will focus on residential architecture,
which has generated a noticeable amount of
litigation since the passage of the AWCP Act. By
reference to substantive issues raised during recent
cases, we will also evaluate the usefulness of the
legislation to the architectural profession, and will
discuss the concept of architectural originality, the
need for its protection, and its ultimate impact on
the professional and the physical environment.

Protection before the 1990 AWCP Act

The origins of copyright protection for architectural
designs have foundations in the United States
Constitution (Article I) and the original Federal
Copyright Acts of 1790 and 1909. Before the AWCP Act
was passed, most contemporary architectural works
in the U.S. derived copyright protection, if any, from
the 1976 Copyright Act. Case law based upon the 1976
Act indicates that protection was quite limited, due
largely to the omission of either architectural plans
or designs -both deemed 'useful articles' -which
meant that virtually no building (beyond a few
monuments and decorative elements) was covered
(Demetriadis v. Kaufmann, 1988). The Act afforded
some protection to architectural drawings, which

'We believe that the Act is far from

perfect

and may have resulted in several
unexpected outcomes that do not favour
the architect'
were conceived as similar to the work of an author or
artist, and which were therefore capable of some
coverage of their intellectual merit. Courts, however,
tended to distinguish between the drawings
themselves and the ideas they encapsulated so that,
as long as only the building and not the drawings
that were created to incorporate them were copied,
no liability could ensue (Imperial Home v. Lamont,
1972).
Copyright protection for architectural works came
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under review when the United States joined the
Berne Convention in 1989, a move precipitated by the
huge financial losses suffered by U.S. copyright
owners to overseas countries where no bilateral
copyright agreementwithAmerica existed. To
understand the 1990 amendments to the Copyright
Act, some background on the Berne Convention will
be helpful. By the time of the first Berne Treaty in
1886, no member country provided specific statutory
protection for architectural works, and the issue of
copyright protection for architecture was first
addressed in the 1986 Paris Conference of the Berne
Convention (Ricketson, 1987). Some delegates
opposed expansion of coverage for architects for fear
that even the most common structures would be
entitled to copyright protection.
The national laws of Berne member countries are
not uniform with regard to architecture, and foreign
statutes have failed to provide much guidance in
determining whether an individual work merited
copyright protection (Pinner, 1960). Consequently,
the Berne member countries have taken a variety of
approaches to copyright protection for architectural
works (Hewett, 1985).
In the U.S. Congressional hearings on adherence to
the Berne Convention, it became obvious that the
'problem' in the American approach to copyright
protection for architecture had never been much
more than a peripheral concern for legislators
(United States Copyright Office, 1989). Moreover,
American architects did not unite behind the
principle of expanded protection for architecture
(United States Congress, 1988).
During the 1988 Berne Convention hearings, the
American Institute of Architects initially supported a
bill that would have expanded copyright protection
for architectural structures. Later, however, the
organization dropped its support for the provision
because the official position was not shared by all of

'Some delegates opposed expansion of
coverage for architects for fear that even
the most common structures would be
entitled to copyright protection'
its members (United States Copyright Office, 1989).
The hearings before the U.S. House of Representatives
on the AWCP Act show that prominent architects
expressed apprehension that copyright protection
might affect their ability to use elements from the
work of other architects: 'Our concern is that the
well-accepted traditions of reference and limited
borrowing of elements and details should be
suppressed' (United States Congress, 199ob).
Nevertheless, Congress determined that the
Copyright Act should be modified to align with the
more restrictive provisions of the European treaty as
expressed in the section concerning Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works. The Berne treaty is
recognized by many nations as creating the
appropriate standards for copyright protection,
which are held as natural rights rather than solely
Robert Greenstreet and Russell Klingaman
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statutory obligations. Accordingly, Congress passed
the AWCP Act in 1990, creating extensive new
protection for architects and their work in the
United States.
A review of the AWCP Act, 1990

The new legislation expands the copyright
protection afforded to architectural works, defined
as 'the design of a building as embodied in any
tangible medium of expression, including a
building, architectural plans and drawings'. It also
extends much further into the realm of the
protection of ideas and originality than previous
Acts, and makes U.S.law more compatible with over
24 other countries regarding copyright issues.
However, the AWCP Act has not existed without
criticism, and a review ofliterature generated in the
aftermath of the Act's creation indicates a number of
perceived problems (Hixon, 1995; Hancks, 1996;
Newsam, 1997; Pollack, 1992; Ray, 1995; Thiel, 1996).
For example, the AWCP Act covers those entities
defined as 'architectural works', including both
habitable and non-habitable structures (such as
churches and gazebos), but specifically excludes
other forms of three-dimensional structures such as
clover leaves, pedestrian walkways and bridges
(Pollack, 1992). Given the recent surge of design
excellence brought to the last category by such
luminaries as the Spanish architect/engineer
Santiago Calatrava, the anomalies of the arbitrary
limitations of protection are evident. It is not clear
whether less easily defined structures that could
potentially imbue. architectural excellence and
which certainly have a demonstrable physical
presence, such as parking garages, grain silos or even
free-standing walls, are afforded copyright
protection. Thus, while some structures may have no
protection, others, which may already have
protection as sculptural works or 'artistic
statements', may arguably be afforded dual coverage
by the provisions of the AWCP Act, which overlays
existing legislation in this field.
Similarly, criticism has been directed towards the
two-part test for copyrightability under the AWCP
Act, which seeks, first, to establish whether any
original design elements exist and, second, whether
these elements are functionally required (Scholl,
1992). The critics claim that the test is vety difficult to
administer without a strictly limited interpretation
of the terms, and therefore that it may ultimately
provide little more protection than the 1976 Act
(Scalione, 1992; Scholl, 1992; Winnick, 1992).
There is also the potential for confusion as to the
legitimate owner of copyright- the architect, the
architectural practice, the party commissioning the
work or the builder of the work- and the degree to
which originality, and therefore protection, can be
attributed to individual structures (Pollack, 1992).
The AWCP Act states that copyrightable material
must be 'an original work of authorship', although
quality, aesthetic merit, ingenuity or uniqueness are
not necessarily factors in its determination. It is
important that such work contains a minimum
amount of original creative expression and that
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protection is not given to standard designs such as
common architectural features, nor any functionally
required elements such as structural walls, doors or
windows. Arguably, standard configurations found
in small houses and apartments, particularly
bathrooms or kitchens, are not protected. The
distinction between original creation and functional
necessity may become difficult, particularly in
smaller design projects where the range of design
elements and variables is more limited.
Since the AWCP Act has been in effect for almost a
decade, it is time to evaluate its overall impact on
architects, builders and others who are potential
plaintiffs or defendants in architectural works
copyright litigation. The next section of the paper
will therefore address several major issues arising
from disputes concerning copyright protection that
have recently emerged.
The Act in operation: unintended drawbacks
While it is reasonable to conclude that the AWCP Act
is an improvement on the previous protection
afforded to architects in protecting not just their
drawings but also their ideas, several recent disputes
have illuminated some drawbacks, or unintended
consequences, of the Act's provisions. The authors
have identified five specific issues for discussion:
1. Who

has the right to sue?

An initial reading of the Act would suggest that the

protection of copyright is afforded to the creator of
the idea -logically the architect. However, in most
cases involving architectural works, the plaintiff has
not been the designer, but a secondary party to whom
copyright ownership had been assigned, typically a
developer or builder. Most of the defendants named
in suits alleging copyright infringement involving
architectural works are also builders- in fact, the
plaintiff's competitors. This raises interesting issues
regarding the original purpose of the legislation to
protect creativity when that creative idea has become
a commodity to be sold or transferred to a third party
for their ownership and use.
2. How can damages be apportioned fairly for copyright
violation?
The problem of providing a remedy for infringement
has led to some interesting, and perhaps unforeseen
developments. While damages in several recent cases
have been determined based upon the architect's loss
of profit according to his/her fee scale, there have
also been some attempts to push the concept of
damages beyond simply the cost of the design work
to the cost of the actual property and even to the
potential income derived from that property over its
useful life. In a recent case (settled before trial), the
plaintiff, a contractor/developer who claimed to own
the copyright of an unremarkable group of
apartment buildings, sued the owner of a similar
building some distance away. The claim extended
beyond the loss of fees to design the project, and even
beyond the loss of profit the contractor claimed for
not building the second project. It included not only
the cost of the buildings themselves but, by a
remarkable stretch oflogic, the rental income of the

alleged infringing apartment for a period of 40 years
- a total claim exceeding the modest architectural
services fee by hundreds of thousands of dollars.
While the immediate remedy provided by the Act to
architects in securing reasonable fees for their
legitimate work is useful, the extent to which claims
can be made for loss of profit is still unclear, and may
lead to further enormously inflated claims until
some clarity is brought to the situation.
3· To what extent does copyright protection address
standard features, functional elements and basic design
ideas?
Determining what constitutes a protectable
architectural structure is a variation of the familiar
and troublesome question of what constitutes a 'work
of art'. This is a major issue for consideration,

'The AWCPAct states that copyrightable
material must be 'an original work of
authorship', although quality, aesthetic
merit, ingenuity or uniqueness are not
necessarily factors in its determination'
particularly with regard to residential designs, which
are often dictated by numerous standard, functional,
conventional andjor code-required design features.
Clearly, the U.S. Copyright Act does not protect all
architectural works (Scalione, 1992). In fact, the Act
specifically states that it does not protect standard
configurations of spaces or individual standard
features, covering only the artistic (non-standard)
features and/or designs ofbuildings. Unfortunately,
determining what is a 'standard' feature or a 'nonstandard' design element is an ad hoc and subjective
exercise.
Architectural creativity and progress, you could
argue, are best served by making standard individual
elements and configurations freely available for use
by others. Hence, an architect's work should not
encompass the exclusive right to use basic design
elements such as skylights, courtyards, domes,
columns, gables, and other basic shapes (Shipley,
1986). Copyright protection for basic architectural
shapes and configurations would therefore inhibit
or preclude architects from drawing upon common
sources, borrowing ideas, and concepts, or from
imitating the styles of their contemporaries and
predecessors (Brainard, 1984). Accordingly, architects
need some latitude so that they can modify and
perhaps improve upon basic architectural styles,
ideas, and concepts without the threat of
infringement actions associated with every building
they design. Allowing architects to use copyright law
to empower themselves to prohibit subsequent use
of basic shapes and layouts would be problematic
because it would create a monopoly on the standard
features encompassed in a particular building
(Scholl, 1992).
Similarly, copyright protection does not extend to
functional items in architectural works. The
legislative history of the AWCP Act explains that the
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Act does not protect architectural design elements
that are determined by function (United States
Congress, 1990c). Patent law, not copyright law, is
designed to prevent the copying and use of
utilitarian works such as architectural drawings and
buildings, and courts oflaw are mindful to avoid
interpreting the Copyright Act so as to create an
illegitimate patent-type claim (Buecher, 1990;
Copyright Office Report, 1989; Demetriades v.
Kaufmann, 1988).
According to U.S. House ofRepresentatives Report
No. 101-735 (United States Congress, 1990c),
functionality cannot be ignored in evaluating the
copyrightability or scope of protection for
architectural work Even if the Copyright Office
issues a certificate of registration, copyright
protection should be denied for all functionally

'For example, the neo-Shingle Style houses
designed by the architect, Robert A. M.
Stern, which incorporate turrets and other
fanciful embellishments, are likely to merit
copyright protection, whereas the roof of a
simple, traditional Cape Cod-style house
should not qualify'
determined design elements. The report states:
'Under such circumstances, the Copyright Office
should issue a certificate of registration, letting the
courts determine the scope of protection'. This raises
an important issue, of course, especially in
residential buildings, where it could be argued that
the majority of elements are functionally
determined (Hewett, 1985).
Elements such as roofs, gables and windows are
likely to be dictated by the structure's primary
function- providing shelter and light to the
building's occupants. Such features cannot exist
independently from their utilitarian aspects as
independent works of art and, therefore, should not
be entitled to copyright protection.
Most house designs - especially small or low
budget designs- are influenced by substantial
functional considerations that may contain few nonfunctional architectural design elements that would
qualifY for copyright protection. For example, the
neo-Shingle Style houses designed by the architect,
Robert A.M. Stern, which incorporate turrets and
other fanciful embellishments, are likely to merit
copyright protection, whereas the roof of a simple,
traditional Cape Cod-style house should not qualifY
(Roth, 1979).
The functionality test has been used to preclude
copyright protection for numerous useful articles in
the design realm. For example, a light fixture which
had a 'pleasing shape' and was designed for use for
outside lighting was not afforded copyright
protection, because it was judged that no artistic
feature was separable or distinguishable from the
article's useful form (Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 1978).
Similarly, the idea of a tower with an enclosed
Robert Greenstreet and Russell Klingaman
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structure on top was equally uncopyrightable
(Wickham v. Knoxville, 1983).
With regard to basic design ideas incorporated
into residential designs, copyright protection
extends only to the particular expression of an idea,
never to the idea itself (Reyher v. Children's
Television, 1976). Copyright protection, unlike a
patent, gives no exclusive right to the art itself (Mazer
v. Stein, 1954). This idea-expression distinction is
necessarily subjective, and where idea and
expression are indistinguishable, copyright law will
protect only against identical copying (Peter Pan v.
Martin Weiner, 1960; Sid & MartyKrofftv. McDonalds,
1977)An example of this problem can be found in Hubert
Rosenthal]ewelryv. Kalpakian (1971). In that case,
plaintiff charged the defendants with copyright
infringement of a pin in the shape of a bee encrusted
with jewels. While the case did not involve
architectural works, it is instructive with regard to
the ideal expression dichotomy. The court explained:
We think the production ofjeweled bee pins is a larger
private preserve than Congress intended to be set aside in
the public market without a patent. Ajeweled bee pin is
therefore an 'idea' the defendants were free to copy.
Plaintiff seems to agree, for it disavows any claim that
defendants cannot manufacture and sell jeweled bee pins
and concedes that only plaintiffs particular design or
'expression' ofthe jeweled bee pin 'idea' is protected under
its copyright. The difficulty, as we have noted, is that on
this record the 'idea' and its 'expression' appear to be
indistinguishable.
In other words, when the 'idea' and its 'expression'
are inseparable, copying the 'expression' will not be
barred, since protecting the 'expression' in such
circumstances would confirm a monopoly of the
'idea' upon the copyright owner free of the
conditions and limitations imposed by patent law.
Similarly, in the context ofliteraryworks, courts
have adopted a scenes afa ire approach, these being
stock literary devices which are not protectable by
copyright (Reyher v. Children's Television, 1976). In
the context of architecture, stock design elements,
similar to stock literary devices, are not
copyrightable. In other words, similarity of
expression, which necessarily results from the fact
that the common idea is only capable of expression
in more or less stereotypical forms, precludes
copyright protection.
Cases such as Rosenthal Jewelry indicate that
copyrightability should be approached as a sliding
scale or spectrum (Concrete Mach. v. Classic Lawn,
1988). At one end ofthe spectrum lie the 'strongest'
works in which complex or fanciful artistic
expressions predominate. Such works are entirely
products of the author's creativity, rather than a
collection of similar themes (Sid & Marty Krofft v.
McDonalds, 1977). At the opposite end of the
spectrum is the bee pin which was the subject work
in Rosenthal Jewelry. In the Krafft case, the court
explained: 'The scope of copyright protection
increases with the extent expression differs from the
idea'. Some residential works will certainly fall
towards the noncopyrightable end of the spectrum.

Architectural copyright: recent developments
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In many residential designs, bedrooms, ldtchens,
bathrooms, living rooms, dining rooms, deck/patios,
windows, doors, stairs or gables, are no more than
standard architectural features. Thus, the entire
layout of some small houses will be the architectural
equivalent of scenes afaire - and may therefore receive
copyright protection only with proof of identical
copying (Coates-Freeman v. Polaroid, 1992).
Howardv. Sterchi (1992), is a case in point. In that
case, the designer of a country-style log home
brought suit against a company in the business of
manufacturing and erecting log homes, alleging
copyright infringement. On appeal, the plaintiff
asserted that the district court erred in holding that
there was no infringement. The federal Court of
Appeals held that the plaintiff failed to establish
copyright infringement of the floor plan. The court
determined that, although the plaintiff proved that
the defendant had access to the designs, the
copyright infringement claim failed because the
defendant's plans were not substantially similar to
the plaintiff's. In determining whether the plans
were substantially similar, the district court
evaluated points of similarity and points of
dissimilarity between the two plans. After this
analysis, the court held that, although the floor
plans were visually similar and the layout was
generally the same, the dissimilarities were
significant, particularly along the rooflines, the bay
window and the dimensions. The court noted that,
in country-style frame houses and i).l houses built
with logs which dictate that only square angles be
used, similarities in the general layout of rooms can
easily occur innocently:
The variety ofways that 2-story rectangle can be divided
into three bedrooms, two baths, kitchen, great or a living
room, closets, porches, etc., is finite. In architecture
plans of this type, modest dissimilarities are
more significant than they maybe in other types
of artworks.
The appellate court determined that the district
court did not err in determining that the
dissimilarities were significant.
In a similar case,]. R. Lazaro Builders, Inc. v. R. E.
Rip berger Builders, Inc. (1995), the court held:
Thus, in order for there to be infringement, the substantial
similarity must be ofthe protectable expression and not
the idea itself The idea/expression dichotomy is very
important for copyright protection of architectural works
and home designs; obviously, placing a bathroom
adjacent to a bedroom or a walk-in closet in a
master bedroom in a house are ideas not capable
of copyright protection. Substantial similarity
must be evaluated, instead, 'on the basis of the
original design elements that are expressive of
the [designer's] creativity'
The court went on to explain that, 'the instance case
is illustrative of the difficulty of accessing a
designer's creativity in the context of a rather
common house'. Both parties conceded that home
designers regularly look to existing home designs as
departure points for expressing their creativity,
which therefore raises the definition and
acceptability of derivative design (Winnick, 1992).

4· What is derivative design?

Copyright law provides protection for 'derivative
works', although this protection is quite limited.
Most reasonably-priced residential buildings can be
considered- at best- 'derivative', and copyright of
derivative works is subject to two important and
related limitations. First, the original aspects of a
derivative work, if any, must contain some
'substantial originality' (l. Batlin v. Snyder, 1976;
Chamberlin v. Uris Sales, 1945). Second, the scope of
copyright protection afforded a derivative work
involves only the substantially original and nontrivial features, if any, contributed by the author to
the derivative work
A derivative work must be substantially different
from the underlying work to be copyrightable
(Gracen v. Bradford Exchange, 1983). The substantial
originality rule is designed to ensure a 'sufficiently
gross difference' between the underlying work and
the derivative work to avoid 'entangling' subsequent
authors in 'copyright problems'. Failure to enforce
the substantial originality rule would wrongfully
inhibit the creation of any other derivative works by
giving the first 'creator' the power to interfere with
the creation of any subsequent works from the same
underlying work The problem can best be illustrated
with an analogy:
Suppose Artist A produces a reproduction of the Mona
Lisa, a painting in the public domain, which differs
slightly from the original. B also makes a reproduction of
the Mona Lisa. A, who has copyrighted his derivative work,
sues B for infringement. B' s defense is that he was copying
the original, not A's reproduction. But if the difference
between the original and A's reproduction is slight, the
difference between A's and B' s reproductions will also be
slight, so that ifB had access to A's reproductions the trier
offact will be hard-pressed to decide whether B was
copying A or copying the Mona Lisa itself(Gracen, 1983).
In Past Pluto v. Dana (1968), the plaintiffbrought a
copyright action concerning Statue of Liberty
memorabilia. On appeal, the principal question

'Recent cases show that most parties
claiming copyright protection for
architectural works are not the designers
who created the original work'
concerned whether plaintiff's work was sufficiently
original to be copyrightable as a derivative work
under section 103 of the Copyright Act. The court
held as follows:
Although derivative works may be copyrighted, see 17
U.S.C. § 103(a), the copyright protection extends only to
the original contributions ofthe derivative work's author,
see 17 U.S. C.§ 103(b). The new copyright in no way
embraces or protects the underlying, pre-existing
work
The court explained:
If a court, upon examining a derivative work, cannot
discern any original contribution, it follows that the
derivative work cannot be the subject of a valid copyright.
The Second Circuit has consistently held the derivative
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works, in order to be copyrightable, must 'contain some
substantial, not merely trivial originality'.
The substantial originality rule is designed to
prevent the extension of copyright protection to
minuscule variations that would put a 'weapon for
harassment' in the hands of plaintiffs. The rule is
also designed to prohibit the appropriation and
monopolization of work already in the public
domain, so that where the only changes to the preexisting work are minuscule, the current work is not
subject to copyright protection (Durham Industries
v. TomyCorp, 1980).
Similarly, where the evidence shows that
similarities between two works can be explained by a
prior common source or independent creation, an
infringement claim is likely to fail, as in the case of
Hayden v. Chalfant Press, Inc. (1959), where judgment
was given to the defendant because the maps
published by the defendant were not copied from
plaintiffs maps: 'On the contrary, they were copied,
with additions, from maps prepared by [a thirdparty] the Automobile Club .. .'
Consequently, to be subject to copyright
protection, the technical drawings for a 'derivative'
building must contain some new and substantially
original material. If two separate works are strikingly
similar to one another, it does not necessarily

'The chilling effect of the legislation is to
limit the free flow of ideas and curtail the
architect's creative development, resulting
instead in a limited palette of conventional,
safe solutions- an inappropriate climate
for the healthy development of
architectural design ideas'
constitute an infringement if each can be proven to
be the result of completely independent effort. This
is especially true where both works are derived from
common sources and materials available to all.
5· How will architectural design be affected by the
protection of originality?

On first examination, copyright protection for
architects would seem to be an improvement on the
previous state of affairs: buildings, not simply
drawings, can now be protected. While the new Act
may be generally beneficial to the profession, there
appears to be another unintended consequence of
the legislation which can be disadvantageous to the
practitioner in the design realm.
Recent cases show that most parties claiming
copyright protection for architectural works are not
the designers who created the original work.
Furthermore, most of the cases have concerned
housing units, which have hardly fallen into the
category of cutting edge design. Thus, there has been
a great deal of copyright activity, often by
homebuilding companies claiming, and often
receiving, protection for housing prototypes that are
modest both in scale and in design aspirations. These
Robert Greenstreet and Russell Klingaman

I

plaintiffs have sued their local competitors alleging
that the competitors' designs are copies. This raises a
question as to the degree to which simple buildings
can vary, given the limited number of variables in
their composition- doors, windows, roof, etc.- and
the necessity for all to share certain 'functional
features' which are common to all, an issue that was
explored previously. Simply put, there are only so
many configurations possible between a kitchen and
dining room, and finite possibilities of appearance
given the volumetric and functional limitations of a
modest functional building.
The problem is compounded because the plaintiffs'
designs are often not particularly original in the first
place, deriving their form and appearance from
traditional styles such as 'Saltbox', 'Colonial' or
'Williams burg'. Should copyright law prohibit the
architect from designing in a similar style to
neighbouring properties for fear oflegal action? Such
a chilling effect would add a strange new dimension to
the design process by forcing the architect to strive for
new degrees of originality based not on client
requirements, site considerations or personal vision,
but upon fear ofliability. Further implications of a
design-to-be-different strategy can also be predicted at
a collective level, where the visual impact of such
diversity could be problematic. This concept was
initially elaborated upon at the U.S. Senate hearings
for the AWCP Act by a representative of the American
Institute of Architects, who stated that:
The pleasing aesthetic unity presented by a New England
fishing village would have been, at best, extremely
difficult to achieve had someone possessed a copyright on
white clapboard Cape Cod cottages and picket fences
(United States Congress, 1988).
Furthermore, as copyright protection covers the
rights of individuals on a building-by-building basis,
it cannot deal with the notion of multiple buildings
or, therefore, the issue of architectural precedent
and the need to create visually coherent
communities. In most residential neighbourhoods,
creating visual harmony with existing surroundings
by taking a contextual approach is a reasonable
design strategy. If copyright protection is vigorously
pursued in each building's case, then each new
addition to the community should, it could be
argued, be designed consciously to avoid any
similarities to its neighbours- hardly a recipe for a
coherent physical environment. Such was the case in
the legal battle involving the Trump Tower in New
York City where, following a successful copyright
protection suit against the owner of a nearby
building, changes were mandated to alter its form
and appearance to look less like the original
building. This, despite the fact that the buildings
emanated from the same designer, who had assigned
his copyright to the eponymous owner of the Trump
Tower (Greenstreet, 1998). Arguably, the two towers
together would have created a coherent and visually
powerful gateway to the street and the
neighbourhood, but copyright protection forced a
design change to the newer building to achieve the
opposite effect.
If architects are forced to design each residential
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building differently, it has been suggested that the
legislation might 'encourage architectural
homogeneity of quite a different sort'. The AlA
evidence at the Senate hearings reflects on the
possible incentive architects may have to repeat their
own earlier copyrighted work to avoid the potential
legal exposure that creating new (and possibly
already copyrighted) design solutions would entail.
The chilling effect of the legislation is to limit the
free flow of ideas and curtail the architect's creative
development, resulting instead in a limited palette of
conventional, safe solutions- an inappropriate
climate for the healthy development of architectural
design ideas.
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